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SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CENSUS CLAUSE:




The biographies of Adolf Hitler, General William Tecumseh Sherman, and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt share one common element: each leader used census data
to advance infamous governmental objectives.  Hitler used European census data to
identify and target the Jewish population;1 Sherman employed United States census
data to assist with his march through Georgia;2 finally, Roosevelt used census data
to facilitate the creation of Japanese internment camps during World War II.3
While most view the census as an innocuous count of the population that occurs
every ten years by a constitutional mandate,4 the United States government has in-
creasingly begun to ask more questions on the mandatory decennial census.5  Some
consider these additional questions to be an invasion of privacy and outside the scope
of what is constitutionally authorized for enumeration.6 As a result of the controversy
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1 See generally EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2001) (discussing
Hitler’s use of census data to locate the German Jewish population during the Holocaust).
2 Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs of
Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 27.
3 A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and
the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 732–33 (1995); see infra notes 190–95 and accom-
panying text.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
5 U.S. Census Bureau, History: Index of Questions, http://www.census.gov/history/www/
through_the_decades/index_of_questions/index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (“[T]he census
has grown from a ‘head count’ to a tool enabling us to better understand the nation’s inhabi-
tants, their pursuits and activities, and needs. Expansion of the census began in 1810, when
enumerators also asked questions related to the industrial pursuits of the nation’s inhabitants.
In 1850, the census began collecting ‘social statistics’ (information about taxes, education,
crime, and value of estate, etc.) and mortality data. . . . As a result of the census’s evolution,
the constitutionally mandated census has grown to provide volumes of data about the U.S.
population and its housing.”).
6 See, e.g., Census Chief Says He Doesn’t Expect Privacy Lawsuit to Stand in Court,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 26, 2000, at 29A; Rhonda Cook, Atlantan Pushing Census
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stemming from privacy concerns, and the subsequent drop in return rates of com-
pleted census questionnaires during the 2000 census, the Census Bureau devised a
new approach for the 2010 census.7
Prior to the 2010 census, the census included both a long form and a short form
questionnaire.8  The short form asked questions only for enumeration, while the long
form asked myriad questions that assessed everything from commuter times to the
respondent’s access to running water.9  The privacy objections from the 2000 census
focused on the invasiveness of the information gathered by the census long form,10
which Congress and government agencies justified as necessary for general legisla-
tive and administrative purposes like allocating federal funding for programs such
as Medicaid.11
Overhaul, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 3, 2000, at A1; see also infra notes 41–44 and accom-
panying text.
7 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DECENNIAL CENSUS: OVERVIEW OF HISTORICAL
CENSUS ISSUES (1998) (“As a result of changing attitudes toward government in general,
concerns that census information will be passed to other government agencies, and fears of
further loss of privacy in the computer age, the rate at which the population voluntarily re-
sponds to requests for census information has declined. For example, mail response (considered
to be the most reliable and cost-efficient means of obtaining census information) declined from
78 percent in 1970 to 65 percent in 1990.”); Haya El Nasser, Plan Could Make Census’ Long
Questionnaire Short-Lived, USA TODAY, Apr. 7, 2000, at 4A; see also infra notes 58, 60 and
accompanying text.
8 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 12 n.5 (“Decennial census data are
gathered from short and long form questionnaires. Questions on the short form are asked of
the entire population, and questions on the long form are asked of only a portion of the popu-
lation for projection of national information.”); see also infra note 37 and accompanying text.
9 Letter from Robert P. Parker, Chief Statistician, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to The
Honorable Dave Weldon, M.D., Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil Serv., Census, and Agency
Org., Comm. on Gov’t Reform, House of Representatives, and to The Honorable Dan Miller,
Vice-Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil Serv., Census, and Agency Organization, Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, House of Representatives 4 (Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter
from Parker] (“To provide the basic population counts, which are required for congressional
apportionment and redistricting, a short form is mailed to all housing units. A long form is
mailed to a sample of housing units to provide detailed information for many federal programs,
including such topics as population and housing characteristics, incomes, education, trans-
portation, and disabilities at the Census tract level.” (citations omitted)); see also infra notes
38, 40 and accompanying text.
10 Letter from Parker, supra note 9, at 4 (“[F]or the tests conducted from 1996 to 2002,
the Bureau reported that it had received about 250 letters expressing concern about the ACS.
In a review of 82 of these letters . . . the major concern appeared to be privacy.”); see also
infra note 44 and accompanying text.
11  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 14 (“For fiscal year 1998, funding
estimates indicate states should receive about $170 billion in aid through 20 federal programs
that used census data, in whole or in part, to allocate that aid. The largest of these programs
is Medicaid, which plans to distribute about $104.4 billion in fiscal year 1998, followed by
the Federal Aid Highway Program at $20 billion, and $7.5 billion under Title I grants to local
education agencies.”); see also infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
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Given the perceived usefulness of the data from the census long form, Congress
did not want to completely eliminate it; however, Congress also felt compelled to
address constituent privacy concerns.12  The solution for the 2010 Census: Congress
and the Census Bureau re-named the long form the American Community Survey
(ACS).13  The ACS is administered annually instead of every ten years, and is still con-
sidered a mandatory component of the census even though the questions asked are
not required for enumeration.14
This Note examines the normative concerns and constitutionality of the new
American Community Survey.  Part I explains the impetus for the ACS and provides
pertinent background information regarding the history of the census.  Part II intro-
duces the ACS, particularly addressing how the government will use it.  In addition,
Part II provides the Census Bureau’s rationale and justifications for the creation of
the ACS.  Part III argues that the ACS is not constitutionally authorized under the
Census Clause, and that normative concerns over misuse and privacy trump the gov-
ernment’s need to collect the data.  Part IV provides an alternative to the ACS, and
notes that if the government sincerely needs the information for efficient planning
purposes, then the Census Bureau must collect the data in a manner that minimizes
privacy concerns as well as guards against the potential for misuse.
I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CENSUS
A. The Constitution and Title 13 of the United States Code
The United States census occurs every ten years by constitutional mandate.15 
The constitutional purpose is to count the population in order to apportion proper
12 See Robert A. Rosenblatt, GOP Addresses Public’s Census Concerns, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2000, at 20.
13 Letter from Parker, supra note 9, at 5 (“If approved, beginning with the 2010 Census,
the ACS would replace the long form, which, as GAO reported in 1998, ‘. . . is a cost-effective
method of providing baseline and trend data for use by federal agencies and various other
census stakeholders, compared to the alternative of multiple data collections by other federal
agencies for their own purposes.’ Thus, because the ACS would replace the decennial census
long form, it would be important for the ACS to continue to serve federal agencies in the same
role as the long form.” (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7)); see also infra
notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
14 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: KEY
UNRESOLVED ISSUES 1–2 (2004) (“The ACS will contain the same questions as the long form
but will be mailed monthly to an annual sample of 3 million housing units. With the smaller
sample, the ACS is designed to provide the same information at the same level of geographic
detail as the long form by means of a continuous measurement methodology in which survey
responses will be accumulated over time.”); Letter from Parker, supra note 9, at 3 (“The
Bureau determined, and GAO has agreed in a recently issued legal opinion, that it has the
statutory authority to conduct the ACS as a mandatory survey, like the decennial census long
form the ACS would replace.”); see also infra note 65 and accompanying text (supporting
the assertion that the ACS is an annual survey).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years 
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representation in Congress, as well as allot electors for the Electoral College.16  Until
1902, either Congress passed authorizing legislation or the President issued an exec-
utive order to dictate the guidance for each decennial census.17  This ad hoc practice
resulted in a census that varied in terms of how the government administered it every
ten years.18  As opposed to the earlier census, the modern census is rooted in two pieces
of legislation and is administered by one federal agency.19  Congress passed the first
piece of legislation when Theodore Roosevelt pushed for the creation of a permanent
agency to administer the census.20  The Permanent Census Act created the Census
Office on March 6, 1902.21  The second piece of legislation is found in Title 13 of
after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term
of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”).
16  Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State. . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”).
17 See U.S. Census Bureau, History: Legislation, http://www.census.gov/history/www/
census_then_now/legislation/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (providing “sample[s] of the leg-
islation and executive orders affecting census activity throughout the history of the United
States”).
18 Id. (“The census has been guided by authorizing legislation since 1790. Through the
mid-nineteenth century, this legislation was very detailed: it listed questions to be asked and
gave detailed instructions to the enumerators. . . . [A]lmost all of the work for the count was
done on the state and local level by federal marshals. The lack of national leadership meant that
census acts had to be very specific; it was the only way the federal government could assure
that the marshals would return standardized information. As census operations became more
centralized and federalized in the latter part of the nineteenth century, legislation relating to
the census became less detailed. Instead, it . . . left the actual design of census questionnaires
up to the superintendent of the census.”).
19 Id.; U.S. Census Bureau, History: Legislation 1902–1941, http://www.census.gov/
history/www/census_then_now/legislation/legislation_1902_-_1941.html (lasted visited Jan. 1,
2010) (stating that the Permanent Census Act “[m]akes the temporary census office a perma-
nent bureau within the Department of the Interior”); U.S. Census Bureau, History: Legislation
1943–1954, http://www.census.gov/history/www/census_then_now/legislation/legislation
_1943_-_1954.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (stating that Title 13 of the United States Code
“[c]ollects and codifies the various laws governing the statistical activities of the Census
Bureau”); see also the current census legislation at 13 U.S.C. §§ 1-402 (2006).
20 U.S. Census Bureau, Census: Then and Now, http://www.census.gov/history/www/
census_then_now/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (“Recognizing the growing complexity of the
decennial census, President Theodore Roosevelt asked Congress to convert the temporary
Census Office into a permanent agency in 1902.”).
21 U.S. Census Bureau, History: Legislation 1902–1941, supra note 19; see also U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 17 (“[T]he census offices that Congress authorized
every 10 years closed when the work of each successive census was done. In 1902, Congress
established the Bureau of the Census, under the Department of the Interior, as a permanent
agency that, for the first time, would not disband between censuses.”).
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the United States Code, which Congress enacted on August 31, 1954.22  This title codi-
fied the administrative details for carrying out the census.23 Currently, the Bureau
of the Census (Census Bureau) conducts the decennial census.24  If an individual
receives a census survey, a response is mandatory, with noncompliance punishable
by fines and criminal sanctions.25
B. Financial and Administrative Evolution of the Census
Thomas Jefferson directed the first census, which counted a population of 3.9
million and took place on August 2, 1790.26  This first enumeration asked just five
questions at a total cost of $44,000, or 1.1 cents per capita.27  By comparison, the 2010
census is anticipated to cost “around $11 billion,” or around $36 dollars per capita,28
and count over 308 million people in the United States.29  The Director of the Census
Bureau defended the high cost of the modern census by stating:
22 Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1158, 68 Stat. 1012; U.S. Census Bureau, History: Legislation
1943–1954, supra note 19 (noting that Title 13 “[c]ollects and codifies the various laws gov-
erning the statistical activities of the Census Bureau”); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, supra note 7, at 17 (“While legislation passed in 1850 made a new authorization for
each decennial census unnecessary, Congress continued to pass legislation every decade for
implementation of upcoming censuses. In 1954, title 13 of the U.S. Code was enacted to
establish the basic rules for the taking of future decennial censuses. . . .”).
23 See 13 U.S.C. §§ 1-402.
24 U.S. Census Bureau, Censuses and Surveys, http://factfinder.census.gov/jsp/home/saff/
main.html?_lang=en (follow “About the Data” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (noting
that in addition to the decennial census, “the Census Bureau conducts nearly one hundred other
surveys and censuses every year”).
25 See 13 U.S.C. §§ 221-225 (explaining the offenses and penalties associated with the
census); Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr, The Security of Our Secrets: A History of
Privacy and Confidentiality in Law and Statistical Practice, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 147, 159
n.53 (2005) (“Although these legal sanctions are rarely applied to nonrespondents, there is
evidence that a reminder that a response is required by law increases the rate of compliance
to requests for data from the census . . . .”). Upon a request by Congress, the Census Bureau
tested the ACS using “voluntary” instructions, which stated that the survey was not mandatory.
Id. Return rates fell by twenty percent with the voluntary language. Id.
26 U.S. Census Bureau, History: Fast Facts—1790, http://www.census.gov/history/www/
through_the_decades/fast_facts/1790-2.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). The United States
“in 1790, was the first modern nation to undertake a comprehensive and periodic count of
its population as a regular responsibility of government.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 7, at 8.
27 U.S. Census Bureau, History: Fast Facts—1790, supra note 26.
28 Preparing for 2010: Is the Census Bureau Ready for the Job Ahead?: Hearing Before
the Fed. Financial Mgmt., Gov’t Info., Fed. Services, and Int’l Security Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) [hereinafter
Preparing for 2010: Hearing] (opening statement of Sen. Thomas R. Carper, Chairman, Fed.
Financial Mgmt., Gov’t Info., Fed. Services and Int’l Security Subcomm).
29 U.S. Census Bureau, Interim Projections of the Total Population for the United States 
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[In 1790], [w]e only collected the name of the householder and
the number of other people in the household, by free and slave.
There was very little detail on that questionnaire, and that makes
it easier.
In addition, we were not concerned about confidentiality in
those days, and the results were posted in local areas to see if
anyone had been missed. So it was a collaborative effort. There
were not so many people, apparently, as we perceive today less
enthusiastic about being reported to the government. And we used
U.S. Marshals to collect the census results, which may have added
a more urgent tone to their visits.30
The likely culprit of the modern census’s increasing costs is the fact that census
officials “have constantly sought to increase both the amount and the diversity of
information they collect[ ] about the people of the United States.”31 Thus, the census
asks increasingly more questions that some individuals consider an invasion of their
privacy.32  The Census Bureau defends the type and number of questions on the decen-
nial census by arguing that those questions outside of the scope of pure enumeration
are statutorily required for the allocation of federal funding.33  “Census data directly
and States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2030, http://www.census.gov/population/projections/
SummaryTabA1.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
30 Preparing for 2010: Hearing, supra note 28, at 5–6 (statement of Charles Kincannon,
Director, U.S. Census Bureau).
31 U.S. Census Bureau, History of the Census—Demographics, http://www.census.gov/
history/www/programs/demographic/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
32 E.g., Dennis Byrne, Check Box Marked ‘None of Your Business,’ CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2000, at 43 (editorializing about the “unreasonable, . . . intrusive, overly complex,
unclear, repetitive [and] unnecessary” census questions); Sherry Sylvester, Questions
Questioned; Census’ Long Form Too Personal to Some, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Mar. 25, 2000, at 1A (discussing census respondents concerns about the invasiveness and
purpose of census questions).
33 Preparing for 2010: Hearing, supra note 28, at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Carper)
(“Innumerable programs at all levels of government depend on an accurate census, as does
the work of a number of academics and others out side of government.”); Preparing for 2010:
Hearing, supra note 28, at 24 (testimony of Andrew Reamer, Fellow, Metropolitan Policy
Program, The Brookings Inst.) (“In fiscal year 2004, I estimate that at least $287 billion across
75 grant programs were allocated across the country on the basis of census numbers or census-
derived numbers.”); D. SUNSHINE HILLYGUS ET AL., THE HARD COUNT: THE POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL CHALLENGES OF CENSUS MOBILIZATION 1 (2006) (“[T]wo of the most fundamental
government commodities—money and representation—are linked to the census count. . . .”);
see also U.S. Census Bureau, About the ACS: Subjects Planned for the 2010 Census and ACS,
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/SBasics/Final_2010_Census_and_American_Community
_Survey_Subjects_Notebook.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Census Bureau,
About the ACS].
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affect how more than $200 billion per year in federal and state funding is allocated
to local, state and tribal governments.  The data is also vital to other planning deci-
sions, such as emergency preparedness and disaster recovery.”34  In addition to the
constitutional and statutory uses, census data in the twentieth and now twenty-first
century is used to fulfill programmatic functions such as “planning the right locations
for schools, [and] roads” as well as providing data for “the distribution of funds for
government programs such as Medicaid.”35  Due to the government’s expanded use
of census data, conducting the census is now one of the most coordinated efforts by
the federal government.
C. The Controversial Long Form Provided the Impetus for the Use of the ACS
The 2000 census (Census 2000) “was the largest peacetime mobilization in the
history of the United States, employing approximately 970,000 people to distribute,
collect, and tabulate 400 million questionnaires covering 115.9 million housing units
and 281.4 million people.”36  The census itself consisted of a short form that col-
lected essential information for purposes of reapportionment as well as “a long form
sent to approximately 1 in 6 households that was designed to collect detailed infor-
mation used to distribute fiscal resources under a wide array of federal, state, local,
and tribal programs.”37
34 U.S. Census Bureau, About the ACS, supra note 33.
35 U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main
.html (follow “Decennial Census Learn More” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (noting
that since the mid-1970s, the Census Bureau has “produce[d] small-area population data needed
to redraw state legislative and congressional districts”). Census data is also used to distribute
government funding “for government programs such as Medicaid; planning the right locations
for schools, roads, and other public facilities; helping real estate agents and potential residents
learn about a neighborhood; and identifying trends over time that can help predict future
needs.” Id.; see also H.R. Res. 1262, 110th Cong. (2008) (“Whereas the decennial census is
crucial to Federal policy-makers who distribute billions of taxpayer dollars among many
Federal programs based on the results of those enumerations . . . .”); MARGO J. ANDERSON
& STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS? THE POLITICS OF CENSUS-TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA 1 (1999) (“New census numbers also trigger changes in legislative formulas that
allocate tax revenue . . . through revenue-sharing and grant-in-aid systems. Government policy
makers, scholars, the media, and the private sector also eagerly await the census results each
decade and use the information for myriad public and private purposes.”).
36 Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction of Consumer
Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 859 (2002) (book review).
37 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUESTIONS PLANNED FOR THE 2010 CENSUS AND AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY vii (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/
Questions_Planned_for_the_2010_Census_and_American_Community_Survey.pdf.
“Beginning with the 1960 Census, the first conducted by mail, it became necessary to use
separate forms—a short form to collect population data from all households and a long form
to collect the detailed items from a sample of households.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 14, at 47.
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Specifically, the short form asked “100-percent characteristics” questions for
both people and housing: “Age, Hispanic or Latino origin, Household relationship,
Race, Sex, Tenure (whether the home is owned or rented), [and] Vacancy character-
istics.”38  Beginning in 1940, the long form, which nearly twenty percent of all house-
holds received every ten years,39 also addressed housing and population but with
more detailed and probing questions that covered the following topics:
Population: Ancestry, Disability, Grandparents as caregivers,
Income in 1999, Labor force status, Language spoken at home
and ability to speak English, Marital status, Migration (residence
in 1995), Occupation, industry, and class of worker, Place of
birth, citizenship, and year of entry, Place of work and journey
to work, School enrollment and educational attainment, Veteran
status, Work status in 1999
Housing: Farm residence, Heating fuel, Number of rooms and
number of bedrooms, Plumbing and kitchen facilities, Telephone
service, Units in structure, Utilities, mortgage, taxes, insurance,
and fuel costs, Value of home or monthly rent paid, Vehicles
available, Year moved into residence, Year structure built.40
Although the Census Bureau utilized the long form for a majority of the twentieth
century, Census 2000 coincided with a social and political climate that was highly
suspect of the government requiring the populace to provide extensive information.41 
The news media widely reported the controversy surrounding the privacy concerns
and highlighted the public’s “fears of government databases soaking up vast amounts
of personal information, despite assurances that it will remain confidential.”42
Census 2000 was not the only time in history that citizens considered the census
controversial:
The census has been the subject of controversy at a number of
points in its history. In 1940, there were objections to the inclu-
sion of questions on income, while a proposal to include a ques-
tion on religion in the 1960 Census was dropped in the face of
38 U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census, supra note 35.
39 U.S. Census Bureau, About the ACS, supra note 33.
40 U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census, supra note 35; see also HILLYGUS, supra note
33, at 76–79 (discussing the Census 2000 long form).
41 See generally HILLYGUS, supra note 33, at 17–40 (describing the social and political
climate surrounding the 2000 census).
42 D’Vera Cohn, Census Too Nosy? Don’t Answer Invasive Questions, GOP Suggests,
WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2000, at A01; see also HILLYGUS, supra note 33, at 79–95 (describing
the public reaction to the census controversy).
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public opposition.  The criticism seems to have grown in recent
decades, becoming particularly intense in 2000.  George W. Bush
said, ‘I can understand why people don’t want to give over that
information to the government. . . .  I’m not sure I would either.’ 
One member of Congress suggested that people who received the
long form should complete only the first six questions and include
a letter of protest with their return.43
A Census Bureau study about privacy concerns surrounding the most recent census
revealed that respondents’ main concern focused on the long form.44  Specifically,
the “heightened privacy and confidentiality concerns among long form recipients”
dealt primarily with the skepticism about the government’s purpose for asking such
questions.45  The Census Bureau concluded that the most commonly cited reasons
for reluctance to answer census questions on the long form included: (1) the census’s
“perceived lack of purpose,” and (2) the sentiment that the information gathered by
the census was “none of the government’s business.”46  In particular, questions re-
garding income or disability “arous[ed] considerable concern about the confidentiality
of the answers.”47
In response to the controversy over the long form48 as well as the fact that the
Supreme Court heard constitutional challenges regarding the design of the census,49
and no doubt due to the impending 2000 election,50 members of Congress intervened
43 David Weakliem & Wayne J. Villemez, Public Attitudes Toward the Census: Influences
and Trends, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 857 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
44 See ELIZABETH MARTIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PRIVACY CONCERNS AND THE CENSUS
LONG FORM: SOME EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 5 (2001), available at http://www
.amstat.org/sections/srms/proceedings/y2001/Proceed/00466.pdf (“Respondents expressed
the greatest reluctance to answer long form questions (particularly income) but also some short
form items, such as race and names.”); see also HILLYGUS, supra note 33, at 2 (“[T]he Census
Bureau was unprepared for a political debate that would ultimately question the bureau’s very
right to collect census data beyond a basic head count. This debate centered on the census
long form [the ACS is based on the census long form]: within the heightened political context
of an election year, and with growing public concern about privacy issues, an acrimonious
controversy emerged regarding the form’s intrusiveness.”).
45 MARTIN, supra note 44, at 5.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Morales v. Evans, 534 U.S. 1135, 2 n.1 (2002)
(No. 01-1011) (showing that the long form controversy even spilled over into the court system).
49 See HILLYGUS, supra note 33, at 30 (explaining that “[c]ensus design decisions were
attacked as unconstitutional” and argued twice before the Supreme Court).
50 Id. at 74 (“Every twenty years the constitutionally mandated decennial census in the
United States falls on a presidential election year. In 2000, just as the census mail-back phase
got underway, the census became briefly embroiled in the partisan rancor of the heated political
environment.”).
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in the census debate.51  Six bills came before Congress to limit the information the
census could ask of the population.52  The six bills either proposed to severely limit
the information the Census Bureau could gather or nullified any fines to those who
failed to complete the census forms.53  One bill even created a “Commission for the
Comprehensive Study of Privacy Protection” that would strike a proper balance be-
tween individual concerns for civil liberty and the governmental interest in mandating
and monitoring personal information.54  Although ultimately all of the bills failed, the
proposals typified the growing American sentiment that the government should not
require the populace to provide such extensive details when the information is attached
to a name and location of each enumerated person.55  The Senate, however, passed
a nonbinding resolution stating that “‘no American [should] be prosecuted, fined, or
in any way harassed by the federal government’” for failing to answer questions on
the long form.56
II. THE HISTORY AND CONTENT OF, AND THE POLICY BEHIND, THE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY
A. The ACS Replaces the Controversial Long Form from the 2000 Census
Since “the political climate surrounding Census 2000 was unprecedented in
intensity, visibility, and partisan hostility,”57 planning for the 2010 census necessarily
addressed the privacy concerns over the long form.58  To the Census Bureau, it was
critically important for census form return rates that the respondents felt secure that
the government would protect personal information.59  Accordingly, the Census
Bureau hoped to allay privacy concerns for the 2010 census by “[d]ecoupling the
51 Rosenblatt, supra note 12.
52 HILLYGUS, supra note 33, at 75.
53 See, e.g., H.R. 4085, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing “[t]o amend title 13, United States
Code, to provide that decennial census questionnaires be limited to requesting only the
information required by the Constitution”); Common Sense Census Act of 2000, H.R. 4154,
106th Cong. (2000) (introducing an amendment to Title 13 to “provide that the penalty for
refusing or neglecting to answer decennial census questions shall apply only to the extent
necessary to allow the Government to obtain the information needed for its enumeration of
the population, as required by the Constitution of the United States”).
54 Privacy Commission Act, H.R. 4049, 106th Cong. (2000).
55 See HILLYGUS, supra note 33, at 75.
56 Id. at 74.
57 Id. at 30.
58 The American Community Survey—A Replacement for the Census Long Form?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Census of the Comm. on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 1
(2000) [hereinafter ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form] (opening statement of Rep. Dan
Miller, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Census) (“Today we are here to begin the process of
eliminating the problematic census long form.”).
59 See MARTIN, supra note 44, at 4.
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short form and long form.”60  This change in the 2010 census means that the actual
national census will only use the short form to count the population.61  In addition,
the new annual American Community Survey replaces the controversial census long
form.62  The yearly ACS requires a mandatory response and “collects essentially the
same detailed information on population and housing characteristics, as did the ‘long
form.’”63  Further, the Census Bureau asserts that the data collected in the ACS is
absolutely confidential and any Census Bureau employee found to violate the con-
fidentiality requirement of Title 13, the applicable U.S. Code section, will face fines
and imprisonment.64
B. The Content of the Annual ACS
Initiated in 1996 as a sample survey, the ACS is a “yearly survey that eliminates
the need for a decennial long-form questionnaire, while providing key socioeconomic
and housing data about the nation’s rapidly changing population every year rather than
once a decade.”65  It provides annual data for every area in the United States with a
population of over 65,000, and over time the ACS data will include information on
smaller population groups.66  It is estimated that the ACS will reach 250,000 house-
holds each month at a cost approximating $150 million annually.67
Since the ACS is essentially an annual census long form, according to the Census
Bureau, federal law requires every question included on the ACS to relate to funding
allocations.68  Ranging from available kitchen facilities in the residence, to income
from tips over the past year, to whether members of the household have hearing dis-
abilities, the questions cover every subject that the census long form addressed.69  If
federal agencies want to add a question to the ACS, then the Interagency Committee




64 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 3
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/SBasics/congress_toolkit/QandA.pdf.
65 U.S. Census Bureau, About the ACS, supra note 33. See generally U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 37, at 1.
66 ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form, supra note 58, at 5 (statement of Rep. Carolyn
B. Maloney, Member, Comm. on Government Reform); see also Letter from Parker, supra
note 9, at 2 (“ACS data will be published annually for geographic areas with a population of
over 65,000; as 3-year averages for geographic areas with a population of 20,000 to 65,000;
and as 5-year averages for geographic areas with a population of less than 20,000.”).
67 HILLYGUS, supra note 33, at 116; Letter from Parker, supra note 9, at 1.
68 ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form, supra note 58, at 24 (statement of John Spotila,
Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. and Budget);
see also Letter from Parker, supra note 9, at 2 (“Federal agencies that extensively use the
2000 Decennial Census long-form data for program implementation would use ACS data in
the future if the long form was eliminated.”).
69 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 37.
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for the ACS, which is headed by the Office of Management and Budget, reviews the
potential question to ensure it is rooted in proper legal authority.70  Congress must then
officially approve the proposed questions for the ACS.71
C. Policy Justifications for the ACS
The Census Bureau argues that the ACS is justified and sensible as an alternative
to the long form because (1) it is cost-effective,72 (2) timely,73 and (3) provides the
control for all other surveys.74  The ACS “allows the Census Bureau to focus efforts
on the constitutional requirements to produce a count of the resident population,
employ technology to improve efficiencies, provide more timely data [because the
ACS is annual], improve coverage accuracy, and contain costs while keeping opera-
tional risk to a minimum.”75  Proponents, such as Representative Jo Ann Emerson
from Missouri, cite the need for more data in an “era of decentralized community-
based decisionmaking” in order to effectively plan for the future.76  In short, the ACS
“provides more current, detailed information than has ever been available before.”77
70 Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Rep.
Bob Barr, Vice Chairman, Comm. on Gov’t Reform, House of Representatives, at 5 (Apr. 4,
2002) [hereinafter Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa]; see also Letter from Parker, supra note
9, at 2–3 (explaining how the question justification process functions with respect to the ACS).
71 U.S. Census Bureau, About the ACS, supra note 33 (“[T]he Census Act requires that
not later than 2 years before the next census, the questions to be included on that census be
submitted to Congress. . . . In advance of providing the questions to be included on the next
census to Congress, the U.S. Census Bureau asked federal agencies to provide information
on their data needs, so that only necessary data are collected . . . . The Office of Management
and Budget facilitates the process to validate current uses of census data, determine unnecessary
subjects and questions, and identify new subjects for which questions are required.”); see also
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 22 (“Until the 1930 Census, the details of the
questions on the form were specified minutely by Congress. In the 1929 law authorizing the
1930 Census, Congress specified areas to be investigated but, for the first time, left the exact
questions to the Bureau.”).
72 Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, supra note 70, at 4 (“It is clear that [the] Census
[Bureau] was not reacting to congressional direction in developing the ACS but acting on its
own initiative to address the costs associated with the collection of data in the decennial census
and the timeliness of that data.”).
73 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 37 (“Since the American Community Survey is con-
ducted every year, rather than once every 10 years, it provides more current data throughout
the decade.”).
74 ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form, supra note 58, at 40 (statement of Kenneth Prewitt,
Director, Bureau of the Census) (“The difference in the ACS and all of these other important
surveys is that the American Community Survey is the platform against which all of the other
surveys create their statistical controls.”).
75 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 37.
76 ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form, supra note 58, at 10 (statement of Rep. Jo Ann
Emerson of Missouri).
77 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 37.
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D. Legal Justifications for the ACS
Initially, the ACS began as a supplementary survey in 1996 to “test the operational
feasibility of collecting long form type data” without using the decennial census.78 
The Census Bureau justified its actions under the authority granted to it by 13 U.S.C.
§ 182, which gives the Secretary of Commerce the discretion to administer any survey
“deemed necessary to furnish annual and other interim current data on the subjects
covered by the censuses.”79
Once Congress and the Census Bureau determined that they could expand the
ACS to act as an annual auxiliary to the census, questions arose concerning its legal
authority.80  In response to a letter from Representative Bob Barr, the Vice Chairman
of the Committee on Government Reform, the General Accounting Office (GAO) jus-
tified the ACS in a letter dated April 4, 2002.81  According to the GAO, the Census
Bureau maintains the legal authority to conduct the ACS pursuant to 13 U.S.C. § 141
and § 193.82  Further, the Census Bureau can force respondent compliance by making
the ACS mandatory under 13 U.S.C. § 221.83  Although the GAO letter highlighted
that court decisions and Congressional actions grant substantial deference and dis-
cretion to the Census Bureau with respect to census information, the GAO pointed
out that “the uses of census data have grown significantly beyond congressional
apportionment,”84 which was the original constitutional purpose of the census.85
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY
A. First and Fourth Amendment Challenges to the ACS
In the midst of the long form controversy during the 2000 census,86 in Morales
v. Daley plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the content of the questions
78 Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, supra note 70, at 2.
79 13 U.S.C. § 182 (2006); Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, supra note 70, at 2 (“The
Bureau began conducting supplementary surveys of selected counties under its authority at
13 U.S.C. § 182 . . . .”).
80 Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, supra note 70, at 1.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 4. According to the Census Bureau:
If the ACS was conducted as a voluntary survey, the Bureau would need
to make up for the lower mail response with more interviews to maintain
the proposed level of accuracy of the ACS. Because obtaining responses
by interview is more costly than obtaining responses by mail, conducting
the ACS as a voluntary survey would be more expensive. . . . [T]he
Bureau estimates that a voluntary ACS would cost as much as $20 to
$35 million a year more.
Letter from Parker, supra note 9, at 3.
84 Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, supra note 70, at 3. See generally Kysar, supra note 36.
85 See supra Part I.A.
86 See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
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asked by the Census Bureau on both the long and short forms.87  The plaintiffs sought
a permanent injunction to protect them from answering census questions.88  The ques-
tion presented asked, “‘what kind of information may the United States Government
demand of its citizens and compel them to provide under threat of criminal penalties
should they not do so.’”89  The plaintiffs argued that the only subjects about which
the government could lawfully ask must pertain to “the constitutionally-mandated
enumeration or ‘head-count’ of the people who inhabit the United States and this only
for purposes of apportionment.”90  Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the Census
Bureau has “‘virtually no limits to the intrusiveness of census questions’” and as such,
the questions were “an unconstitutional invasion of the plaintiffs’ privacy” in violation
of the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.91  In response to the plaintiffs’ argu-
ments, the government argued that Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause in conjunction with the Census Clause, which permits Congress to conduct
87 See 116 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Morales v. Evans, 275 F.3d
45 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1135 (2002).




Plaintiffs are complaining . . . about the questions on the short form that
ask a resident of the United States if he is Hispanic and what kind of
Hispanic he is. Plaintiffs also object to the question which asks the resi-
dent what race he would self categorize himself to be. They also object
to the question asking how a person is related to the other persons who
live in the house with him.
On the long form they object to these question[s] and a number of
others. Specifically, they object to the question concerning marital status,
educational background (8–10), ancestry and ethnic origin (10), whether
the person speaks a language other than English, and, if so, which one,
and how well the person speaks English (11), length of residence in the
dwelling (15), medical conditions or problems (16 and 17), where the
person worked ‘last week’ (22), how the person got to work (23), when
the person left home for work and how long it took to get there (24),
work/layoff/absence history (25 and 26), occupation and employer
(27–30), income and source of income (31 and 32), the nature of the
housing, including the number of rooms and bedrooms in the house (37
and 38), plumbing, kitchen, and phone service (39 to 41), information
about rent, mortgage, insurance, and home value (46–53). Plaintiffs also
object to the fact that stated prominently on the envelope in which the
census forms are mailed are the words, ‘You are required by law to
answer these questions.’
. . . They [plaintiffs] feel intimidated by the threat of criminal
sanctions . . . and they feel that if they protect their privacy and refuse
to answer that they will be exposing themselves to hundreds or . . . thou-
sands of dollars in fines.
Id. at 809.
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the decennial census “in such Manner as they shall by Law direct,”92 enables Congress
to collect the nation’s demographic data to carry out “[Congress’s] delegated powers
to govern that population intelligently.”93
Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that the
census questions were constitutional.94  This Note, however, argues that the ACS,
which uses those same questions previously asked on the long form, is unconstitu-
tional.  The ACS is not part of the decennial census.95  It is an annual survey, which
provides information for federal funding, and not apportionment.96  The ACS is treated
as part of the census merely in order to justify mandatory compliance under penalty
of law.97  This Note contends that although the district court in Morales found that
Title 13 authorized the decennial long form, the ACS is unlawful because it is an
annual survey, which, by nature of its yearly implementation, is not authorized by
the Census Clause of the Constitution.  The Census Clause may permit additional
mandatory questions on the decennial census; however, the ACS is an annual survey
that is not a part of the census count conducted every ten years.  The following sec-
tions analyze some of the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the long form in
Morales.  Further, the sections distinguish the court’s analysis of the long form from
Census 200098 to demonstrate why the ACS is not constitutionally justified like the
long form and thus is unlawful.
1. The First Amendment Protection Against Compelled Speech
In Morales, plaintiffs argued that the forced self-classification, on highly charged
issues such as race and ethnicity, in the census questions “violate[d] their rights under
the First Amendment by forcing them to engage in speech which is abhorrent and con-
trary to their beliefs.”99  The plaintiffs stated that they refused to define themselves
by their race and did not wish to categorize themselves in such a manner.100  The free
speech protections of the First Amendment therefore allowed them to refrain from
speech such as filling out the census long form.101  Further, plaintiffs stated that as
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
93 Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
94 Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, aff’d sub nom. Morales v. Evans, 275 F.3d 45 (5th Cir.
2001).
95 As explained in Part II.A, the decennial census will use the short form to collect data
while the ACS, which replaces the census long form, is collected on an annual basis and is not
technically part of the enumeration of the population that occurs every ten years by consti-
tutional mandate. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
96 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 68, 83 and accompanying text.
98 See Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801.
99 Id. at 815.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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a matter of public policy the government should not compile this wealth of data in
one location because of the potential for misuse, arguing instead that misuse is only
completely prevented if the information is never collected.102
The government argued against the notion that the plaintiffs maintained a right
“‘not to speak’” and could “‘withhold information which the federal government has
determined to be necessary for informed government decision making.’”103  The cen-
sus did not ask the plaintiffs to participate in political speech or to adopt a point of
view.104  The government asserted that participants in the census must provide statis-
tical information, which is not “published in any format” that identifies the individual
and “only sworn officers or employees [can] examine individual returns.”105
While the district court recognized the plaintiffs’ concern that the government
would use the information for purposes other than statistical analysis, the court deter-
mined that the “inchoate concern is not enough to make this case one of compelled
speech.”106  The court found no violation of the First Amendment and asserted that
Congress enacted a valid statute mandating that all residents must provide the infor-
mation, which is used to advance a legitimate governmental purpose.107  Moreover,
although the district court recognized that the United States government misused
information from the Census Bureau during World War II to facilitate the adminis-
tration of Japanese internment camps,108 the court did not address the public policy
concern because the plaintiffs did not allege a misuse aimed at discrimination against
them specifically.109
The ACS is a violation of the First Amendment under the logic expounded by the
district court in Morales because there is no longer an “inchoate concern” that the
government will use the data for purposes other than statistical analysis.110  In 2004,
the Census Bureau released information regarding Arab population groups in the
United States to the Department of Homeland Security.111  While the particular uses
102 Id. at 811.





108 Id. at 811 (“Plaintiffs cite, with no challenge by the government, that census data of this
type was used during the Second World War to identify Americans with Japanese ancestry.
These persons were then placed in internment camps for the duration of the war. This is a
startling example of how census data, collected for proper purposes, has been illegally used
by the government for improper purposes.”).
109 Id. (“Plaintiffs argue that if such data is collected, it could only be used for discrimi-
natory purposes. Plaintiffs have not alleged or shown, however, that the data is likely to be
used to discriminate against them specifically.” (citation omitted)). But cf. infra Part III.C.3
(highlighting specific instances of census data misuse to further explain the privacy concerns).
110 See infra Part III.C.3.d (explaining how the government recently used census data to
locate Arab-Americans).
111 Lynette Clemetson, Homeland Security Given Data on Arab-Americans, N.Y. TIMES,
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of that information are unknown, the disclosure of “confidential”112 information in
2004 demonstrates that the World War II misuse of census data to implement intern-
ment camps was not an isolated incident.113  The ACS will now provide more incentive
for misuse because the data is updated annually and admittedly gives the government
“more current, detailed information than has ever been available before.”114  The court’s
characterization of the misuse as an “inchoate concern” is no longer applicable given
this 2004 incident. Therefore, if a plaintiff, such as an Arab-American, brought a new
suit, a challenge using First Amendment grounds might hold water, given the available
information on the 2004 potential misuse of census data.
2. The Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable and Illegal Search
The plaintiffs contended in Morales that the long form, specifically with its
“numerous and intrusive” mandatory questions, “constitute[s] an unreasonable and
illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.”115  The contention rests upon the assertion
that the government should not compel those who receive the long form to answer
questions because recipients of the long form maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy on those subjects inquired into on the form, which include “medical history
and [physical disabilities],” “ancestry and [ethnicity],” “income,” “work habits,” com-
muting time, and residence information—bedrooms, plumbing, whether the residence
is rented or owned and if rented, whether the person pays cash for the rent.116
The government argued in its defense that even the first census in 1790 supports
the constitutionality of census questions that do not directly relate to apportionment.117 
July 30, 2004, at A14 (reporting that Homeland Security used census data to locate Arab-
Americans).
112 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64, at 3 (defending the ACS by asserting that “data
are confidential under Title 13 . . ., [this law] specifies that the Census Bureau can use the
information provided by individuals for statistical purposes only and cannot publish or release
information that would identify any individual”).
113 The district court in Morales agreed that the World War II example is likely not a one-
time occurrence in U.S. history.
The horrors of the twentieth century do not allow one comfortably to
accept the notion that the Japanese-American experience during the
Second World War was an isolated incident in the history of the United
States. We all can envision other ethnic groups who could be treated in
a similar fashion, given the ‘proper’ emergency.
Morales, 116. F. Supp. 2d. at 811 n.5.
114 U.S. Census Bureau, About the ACS, supra note 33. Even the district court in Morales
acknowledged that “in the era of the World Wide Web, with computer ‘glitches’ and human
error that can instantaneously disseminate private information literally all over the world, the
citizen can have a justifiable wariness about the secrecy of the information he gives.” Morales,
116 F. Supp. 2d at 811 n.5.
115 Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 818.
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The district court found it significant that the First Congress administered the first
census and also helped craft the questions and content in the 1790 questionnaire.  Be-
cause the first census asked questions of age, gender, and race, the court concluded that
additional questions on the modern census are not “regarded as an unlawful search.”118 
The district court then proceeded to note the historical underpinnings of the ques-
tions pertaining to medical history.119  Holding that Census 2000 did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, the district court’s reasoning also focused on the methods used
to collect Census 2000 data, which consisted of a mailing as opposed to an intrusion
of the home, as well as the Census Bureau’s strict confidentiality policy.120
Although the district court in Morales justified the long form questions because
the first census asked more questions than just those subjects requisite for counting
or apportionment purposes, the court missed a significant piece of history in forming
its conclusion.  It is important to note that the First Congress rejected an “elaborate
census” proposal by James Madison.121  The First Congress ultimately chose a “more
modest scheme” that focused on a “simple count of the free and slave population re-
quired by the Constitution” and excluded Madison’s questions that sought to classify
“the population by age and sex and a census of occupations.”122  The First Congress
included the minimal race, sex and age questions on the first census123 “to achieve
the object of an ‘actual enumeration’ of persons for the purpose of implementing the
apportionment formula contained in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3.”124
While the more elaborate scheme rejected by Congress does not necessarily
mean that the ACS is an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment, it
demonstrates that Congress sought to limit the information gathered by the decennial
census.  The First Congress’s limitations on data collected in the 1790 census means
that the modern Congress’s conception of the census arguably needs boundaries in
its application.  The annual ACS, in seeking the same information as the long form,
118 Id. “The first census asked if a household had white males or females, whether the white
males were 16 years old or older, and whether ‘other free persons’ lived in the household.”
Id. at 818 n.10.
119 Id. at 819.
120 Id.
121 ANDERSON & FIENBERG, supra note 35, at 17; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 48, at 19–20.
122 ANDERSON & FIENBERG, supra note 35, at 17–18.
123 U.S. Census Bureau, History: Index of Questions—1790, http://www.census.gov/
history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1790_1.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2010) (stating that in 1790, the first census asked “the name of each head of household,” as
well as: 1) “The number of free White males,” 2) “Number of free White females,” 3) “Number
of other free persons,” and 4) “Number of slaves”).
124 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 17–18 (discussing how the Three-Fifths
Clause, which was later amended, was the reason for asking a race question because the
apportionment formula required a counting of both non-whites and whites for purposes of
counting “whole” persons).
2010] SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CENSUS CLAUSE 1115
is “decoupled” from the constitutionally mandated decennial census and is a manda-
tory annual survey without the constitutional purpose of counting for apportionment.
B. Census Clause Challenges to the ACS
Assuming that Title 13 authorizes Congress to conduct an annual survey as part
of the census, the issue is whether the language of Article I, Section 2, Clause 3
(amended by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment) grants Congress the author-
ity to conduct an annual census for purposes other than apportionment. Although in
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives the Supreme
Court acknowledged that Title 13, the authorizing legislation for the census, permits
the statistical “gathering [of] supplemental, nonapportionment census information
regarding population, unemployment, housing, and other matters,”125 the Court did not
address “the constitutionality of including in the decennial census form questions ad-
ducing information for a non-apportionment purpose.”126  These “non-apportionment”
questions are precisely what the annual ACS asks.  Further, the Court did not expound
on the constitutionality of an annual census, like the ACS, aimed at gathering infor-
mation solely for purposes other than apportionment.127
1. The Need for a “Vigilant” Court to Check Congress’s Expansive View of the
Census Clause
The original purpose of Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 is “the apportionment of the
nation’s population, state-by-state, for the dual purposes of ascertaining the number
of each state’s representatives in the House of Representatives and the proportion of
direct taxes to be paid by the people of each state.”128  Thus, Congress used direct tax
as a “fulcrum to counterbalance the ‘principle of representation’” so that the states did
not inflate census numbers in an attempt to gain more representation in Congress.129 
If a state had attempted to exaggerate census numbers, it would have faced high direct
tax consequences.130
125 525 U.S. 316, 337 (1999) (rejecting sampling techniques and requiring actual enumer-
ation for the purposes of counting people for the census).
126 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 3; see Dep’t of Commerce, 525 U.S. 316.
127 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 3.
128 Id. at 8–9, 9 n.3; see also id. at 9 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison) (G.
Carey & J. McClellan, eds., 2001) (expounding on the “two-fold purpose” of apportionment)).
129 Id. at 10 (quoting 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 642 n.2 (5th
ed. 1891)).
130 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 12 (“The census, according to Article I,
section 2, of the Constitution, was also to be used to apportion any direct taxes levied by the
federal government. The founding fathers purposefully linked the two. Their thinking was that
any incentive for a state to boost population in order to gain additional representation would
be offset by the disincentive of raising its tax burden. Direct taxation, however, was enacted
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In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment provided for a federal income tax without
reliance on apportionment and ended the “disincentive of an increase in federal taxes
to curb the natural incentive to over-inflate a state’s population in an effort to enhance
the number of its representatives in the House.”131  This amendment, however, did
not unhinge the responsibility charged by the Census Clause to ensure an accurate
enumeration for purposes of apportionment.132
This addition to the Constitution in 1913 means that the “Court should be even
more vigilant to ensure that Congress does not manipulate the decennial census.”133 
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives is an example
of the Court checking Congress’s expansive interpretation of the Census Clause.134 
Justice Scalia noted in a separate opinion, that “Congress should not be permitted to
depart from the requirement of an ‘actual Enumeration’ of the American people ‘under
the guise of regulating the “Manner” by which the census is taken.’”135
2. Interpreting the Language of the Census Clause: Defining “In Such Manner as
They Shall by Law Direct.”136
In Morales v. Daley, the government argued that the Constitution grants Congress
the power to gather data unrelated to apportionment because the Census Clause autho-
rizes Congress to carry out the census “in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”137 
This argument, however, wrongly assumes that those eight words permit Congress to
change the decennial census’s “constitutionally-defined purpose” of apportionment.138 
This change in purpose is what Congress is doing by adding a yearly ACS aimed at
only twice—once in 1798 to try to diversify the federal government’s reliance on tariffs and
customs duties and once to finance the War of 1812. Both taxes were based on the value of
land, houses, and slaves, and both were difficult to assess and collect. While this authority has
never been repealed, direct taxation based on a decennial census never became practical.”);
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 10 (stating that in the 1895 case
Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), the Supreme Court “expressly
reaffirmed Madison’s view that the constitutional wedding of representation in the House to
direct taxation ‘would produce impartiality in enumeration’”).
131 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 10; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
132 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 11.
133 Id. (emphasis omitted).
134 Id.; see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343
(1999) (rejecting sampling techniques and requiring actual enumeration for the purposes of
counting people for the census).
135 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 11 (citing Dep’t of Commerce, 525
U.S. at 348).
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
137 Id.; Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 (S.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d sub nom.
Morales v. Evans, 275 F.3d 45 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1135 (2002); see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 4.
138 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 15.
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supplying the government with information for federal funding.139  “‘[D]ictionaries
roughly contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution demonstrate’ that
‘manner’ means ‘form’ or ‘method,’ not object or purpose.”140  Thus, the plain lan-
guage of the Census Clause, as amended by the Fourteenth Amendment, authorizes
Congress to select the “manner” or “form” of administering the census, but does not
grant Congress the power to change the purpose of the census by mandating the ACS,
which is an annual census explicitly created for providing federal funding data rather
than for apportionment purposes.
Further, the First Congress rejected an expansive questionnaire, similar to the
information collected by the ACS, which would have provided data for legislating in
the First Census Act.141  James Madison described the proposal to “‘extend[ ] the
census so as to embrace some other objects besides the bare enumeration of the
inhabitants,’” which gave the House “‘an opportunity of obtaining the most useful
information for those who should hereafter be called upon to legislate for their
country.’”142  Congress implemented the first census in accordance with the purpose
of actual enumeration and specifically declined Madison’s proposal to add more
questions aimed at providing data for future legislation.143  In light of the rejection
of Madison’s proposal, the Census Clause authorizes a decennial census to count the
population; the clause does not authorize a yearly survey that permits the government
to create a massive body of statistical data on the populace.  The First Congress em-
braced this view by administering a census that included questions for apportionment
rather than for the purpose of legislating.144
3. The ACS is Not Constitutionally Justified by the Necessary and Proper Clause
Much like the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not permit
an expansive interpretation simply because the Necessary and Proper Clause is in-
voked, the ACS is not justified by the assertion that the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress to carry out annual surveys for non-apportionment purposes.
If Congress cannot mutate its Commerce power into a general
police power for a purpose not permitted under the Constitution,
then Congress should not be permitted to convert its census power
139 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64, at 1 (describing how the ACS “provide[s] critical
economic, social, demographic, and housing information” to assist with planning for federal
legislation).
140 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 16 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
141 Id. at 19.
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into a general power to require the American people to answer any
question that the Census Bureau chooses to ask every 10 years.145
The additional questions on the census long form, which the ACS now asks, were
justified by the district court in Morales as necessary “to enable Congress to exercise
its delegated powers to govern . . . [the nation’s] population intelligently.”146  The
lower court, relying on McCulloch v. Maryland,147 adopted the conclusion that the
Constitution authorizes the long form when considering the Necessary and Proper
Clause in conjunction with the Census Clause.148
In the seminal case McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the Necessary
and Proper Clause gave Congress “‘discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution,’ [and] not discretion with respect
to the objects or purposes of those enumerated powers.”149  Moreover, in Gibbons
v. Ogden,150 after determining that interstate commerce was within the purview of
the Commerce Clause, which permits regulation by Congress so long as it pertains
to “commerce . . . among the several states,” the Court asked, “whether the licensing
statute [at issue] fit within the constitutionally stated object [or purpose] of that
enumerated power.”151
More recent Commerce Clause cases reject the idea that Congress wields a general
federal police power to implement legislation and can rely on the Necessary and Proper
Clause, even when the power at issue is specifically addressed by the Constitution. 
Regarding the commerce power, according to the Court, Congress had no authority
in either United States v. Lopez152 or United States v. Morrison153 to enact the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990154 or the Violence Against Women Act, respectively.155 
Without relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause to extend Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause, the Court’s reasoning in both cases focused on the
tenuous relationship between commerce and violence: in schools for Lopez156 and
against women in Morrison.157  Essentially, the Court struck down the laws under
145 Press Release, William J. Olson, P.C., Census 2000 Fight Continues, http://www
.lawandfreedom.com/site/constitutional/cenintro.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
146 Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 809–10 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
147 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
148 Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 809–10; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 23.
149 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 24 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 421) (emphasis omitted).
150 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
151 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 24–25 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 212–17).
152 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
153 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
154 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
155 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
156 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–62.
157 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
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the Commerce Clause because the laws were not directed at regulating commerce,
which was the purpose of the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause,
and the laws failed to comport with the jurisprudence that has interpreted the clause
since 1783.158
Borrowing from the reasoning of McCulloch and Gibbons, the pertinent issue
here is whether asking arguably invasive and extraneous questions on the ACS, which
yields annual data for federal funding that is not for apportionment needs, comports
with the stated purpose of the Census Clause.  In short, does the ACS statute “fit
within the constitutionally stated object [or purpose] of” the Census Clause?159  Even
the First Congress recognized that the Census Clause was only for apportionment
purposes, rather than a constitutional authorization for the government to collect leg-
islative and administrative statistical data.160  Just as the Court in Lopez rejected the
argument that violence in schools pertains to commerce, an annual survey that asks
questions concerning the availability of indoor plumbing does not sufficiently relate
to the purpose of apportionment, which is the only explicit act authorized by the
Census Clause.  Giving Congress the power under the Census Clause to administer
an annual survey is akin to granting them a general police power.161  As the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Morrison, “[u]nder our written Constitution . . . the
limitation of congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.”162  The
connection between statistical data for federal funding purposes and actual enumeration
for apportionment is too tenuous to authorize an annual census aimed not at counting
for representation, but rather at accumulating data specifically rejected by the First
Congress in Madison’s proposal for the first census in 1790.163
C. Normative Concerns Regarding the ACS
As discussed in Part I, the Census 2000 long form raised a great deal of privacy
concerns.164 Because “[l]ong form questions are not less . . . intrusive because they
158 See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
159 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 25.
160 ANDERSON & FIENBERG, supra note 35, at 17–18 (“[T]he history of successful census
taking turns on . . . the willingness of Americans to see the census as a legitimate and essential
part of the federal governmental machinery. The same men who wrote the Constitution dis-
covered as much when they found themselves as legislators and officials in the new federal
government. One of their first tasks was to write a bill to take the 1790 census. James Madison
proposed a rather elaborate census, which included questions classifying the population by
age and sex and a census of occupations, instead of the simple count of the free and slave
population required by the Constitution. Congress rejected Madison’s proposal and settled
on a more modest scheme.”).
161 See generally Olson, supra note 145, at 2.
162 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616.
163 See supra note 139.
164 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
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are asked in the ACS rather than the decennial environment,”165 the same privacy argu-
ments raised against the long form apply to the ACS.  Privacy, “‘a shield that protects
the sword of liberty,’” is “arguably ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men,’ and an ‘aspect of individual liberty’ that implicates
‘self-possession, autonomy, and integrity.’”166  In addition to the constitutional inquiry
necessarily involved when asking penetrating, intrusive questions of United States
residents in an annual mandatory ACS, a normative question inevitably arises: Should
the government collect the data?  “[E]very time the Census Bureau requests . . . census
or a demographic survey, it is involved in a complicated interaction regarding privacy
concerns and confidentiality beliefs,”167 and the “inevitable conflict between an in-
dividual’s right to privacy and the government’s need for information.”168  Given the
government’s “data-mining” in the last one hundred years,169 the persistent privacy
concerns with the ACS, as well as the potential for misuse of ACS data, the United
States government should not assemble this wealth of information on its residents
using the ACS.
1. The Government’s Increasing Need for Statistical Data
“The United States government has long sought data about individuals,” how-
ever, the collection process was too “time-consuming and expensive and resulted in
data that [was] difficult to use because of the form in which [it was] captured.”170 
But the technological advances and changes to the law in the twenty-first century
“have combined to erode the protection for personal privacy previously afforded by
practical obscurity.”171  The government’s need for increasingly more statistical infor-
mation clashed with the public’s “fear of secondary uses, grounded in an abiding mis-
trust of governmental purpose” and resulted in a “long-standing obstacle to willing
participation and disclosure.”172  The ACS is an example of this ever expanding gov-
ernment data mining, which has sought to “expand the authority of the government
to collect personal data through mandatory disclosure, seizure, independent creation,
165 ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form, supra note 58, at 31 (statement of Kenneth Prewitt,
Director, Bureau of the Census).
166 Walker, supra note 2, at 1 (internal citations omitted).
167 THOMAS S. MAYER, STATISTICAL RESEARCH DIV., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY RESEARCH AND THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: RECOMMEN-
DATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 3 (2002), available at http://www.census
.gov/srd/papers/pdf/rsm2002-01.pdf.
168 Id. at 4.
169 See generally Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework,
43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008).
170 Id. at 435.
171 Id.
172 Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 25, at 155.
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and purchase.”173  In fact, the same arguments that press the government to gain more
information as technology progresses provided the impetus and goals for the ACS.174
2. Persistent Privacy Concerns with the Census
The ACS and the long form are not the first times the census has encountered
privacy concerns.  Initially, instead of addressing the census privacy concerns, the
United States “focused their efforts on coercing compliance” by imposing “substantial
penalties . . . on individuals for failing to comply with census takers” and did not adopt
laws “employed to ensure that data would be kept confidential or otherwise used
appropriately by the census takers or the government.”175
In addition to the “coercive fines,” the first five censuses used “community
policing” by posting the results in “‘two of the most public places’ within each
enumeration district,” which allowed everyone to see who submitted inaccurate or
false information and exposed those who just chose not to participate.176  Privacy
concerns about the census continued to grow in the 1800s, particularly as a result of
“abuses of census data by various officials suspected of exposing survey results for
personal gain, curiosity, or respondent embarrassment,” and “Congress’ insistence that
the subject matter of the census increase beyond mere head-counting.”177
3. Potential for Misuse
To protect census data, the Census Bureau works diligently to ensure confidenti-
ality by requiring the utmost standard of care from enumerators.178  The potential for
173 Cate, supra note 169, at 436.
174 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 37 (The Census Bureau created the ACS in order to
“provide[ ] more current, detailed information than has ever been available before.”); Cate,
supra note 169, at 436 (“The government faces new and intense pressure to collect and use
personal data. Much of that pressure reflects the conviction that greater reliance on digital data
will reduce costs and enhance convenience, speed, efficiency, and accountability. Perhaps the
greatest source of that pressure, however, is the fear of terrorist attacks and the widely shared
view, as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly
referred to as the 9-11 Commission) Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton testified before Congress
in November 2005, that the inability of federal agencies to marshal and share information about
suspected terrorists and their activities ‘was the single greatest failure of our government in
the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks.’”).
175 Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 25, at 155.
176 Id. at 155–56.
177 Id. at 156–57.
178 ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form, supra note 58, at 31 (statement of Kenneth Prewitt,
Director, Bureau of the Census) (“I believe it is hard to sustain the argument that government
data collection is an invasion of privacy when there are such strong protections of the data,
when they are used only for statistical purposes, not for regulation or law enforcement, and
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misuse, however, continues to undermine confidence in a government mandated data
collection survey that is somehow justified by the Census Clause, which was included
in the Constitution for apportionment purposes.  Although Congress passed legislation
that overturned the Supreme Court’s ruling in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States,
which held that courts could subpoena business-retained copies of census forms,179
it is potentially possible for parties in court to use any personally retained copies of the
ACS against the respondents.  Since the ACS is not part of the decennial census, the
question remains as to whether it will receive the same protections afforded to the
census in terms of the parties’ ability to subpoena an individual’s responses to the
ACS.180  Moreover, history is riddled with numerous examples of privacy and confi-
dentiality abuses, and “privacy advocates often dwell on the catastrophic nightmare
scenarios facilitated by unlimited exchange of personal information, from Hitler’s
misuse of the European Census to Sherman’s use of census data to facilitate his March
through Georgia.”181  Hitler used German census data to formulate lists of Jewish names
and addresses with the help of IBM Germany, which developed a census tabulating
machine that “not just . . . count[ed] the Jews—but identif[ied] them.”182  As horri-
fying as Hitler’s plan may sound, even the United States government is not immune
from such misuse.  The government’s use of census data during World War II to facili-
tate Japanese internment camps as well as the Department of Homeland Security’s use
of census data to locate Arab populations in 2004 are just two examples of the United
States government demanding that the Census Bureau turn over data and yield to the
interest of national security.183
The following sections examine the potential for misuse of ACS data in light of
(a) the St. Regis case, (b) the congressional ban on the use of questions regarding
religion, (c) the World War II internment camps, and (d) the use of census data to
locate Arab-Americans in 2004.
a. The St. Regis Case: Can a Court Subpoena ACS Responses for Court
Proceedings?
The Census Bureau provides a second copy of the census form to business
respondents who can then keep a filled-out copy of the submission.184  In St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “these company-retained
copies of census reports could be subpoenaed and used against the reporting com-
when each questionnaire item is linked to a program that the people’s representatives have
enacted.”); MAYER, supra note 167, at 4 (“Census data are protected by law (e.g., Title 13
United States Code) as manifested in a variety of disclosure limitation techniques.”).
179 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
180 See infra text accompanying note 186.
181 Walker, supra note 2, at 27.
182 BLACK, supra note 1, at 10; see also id. at 52–74.
183 See infra Parts III.C.3.c & d.
184 MAYER, supra note 167, at 23.
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pany in legal proceedings,” which meant that the St. Regis Paper Company had to turn
over purportedly confidential and purely statistical census forms to the Federal Trade
Commission.185  Although by the fall of 1962 Congress “amended section 9 of title 13
to extend the confidentiality protection to cover company-retained copies of census
reports,” the question now is will Congress offer the same protections to the ACS or
are submissions to the ACS guided by the standard enunciated in St. Regis?186  While
the ACS is authorized by Title 13 and is currently only sent to households, instead of
businesses as in St. Regis, it is not part of the decennial census, which means it is
potentially outside of the protections offered to the census and could lead to a party
using a respondent’s own submissions against them in court.
b. Census Religion Questions
When the proposal to include a question on the census regarding religion arose
in 1960, “a number of Jewish and liberal organizations . . . made emotional compari-
sons to the question and the circumstances associated with Nazi Germany.”187  In an
effort to “maintain good public relations, and the decision that the need for these par-
ticular data did not merit the possible antagonism of the respondents,”188 Congress
dropped the question and amended Title 13 to forbid a question of that nature in the
future.189  But religion is arguably not any different from data collection about race,
which has an equal if not greater potential for misuse by the government, especially
in light of how the United States used census data pertaining to race in the past.
c. World War II Internment Camps
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt recognized the enormous capacity of the census
in the 1940s when she asserted in a radio address that the census was “‘the greatest
assemblage of facts ever collected by any people about the things that affect their
welfare.’”190  Within two days of the attack on Pearl Harbor and before the United
States declared war, the Census Bureau began locating Japanese Americans with the
same IBM tabulating machines that Hitler was simultaneously using in Germany.191 
The Census Director at the time stated that although “‘[w]e’re by law required to keep
confidential information by individuals, . . . [i]f the defense authorities found 200 Japs
missing and they wanted the names of the Japs in that area, I would give them further
means of checking individuals.’”192
185 Id.; see also St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
186 MAYER. supra note167, at 23.
187 Id. at 24.
188 Id.
189 See 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (2006).
190 BLACK, supra note 1, at 345 (quoting First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 346.
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Ultimately, the government used census data to locate 112,000 Japanese Americans
in order to facilitate their relocation to internment camps during World War II.193  Even
the Director of the Census Bureau in 2000 admitted “‘the historical record is clear
that senior Census Bureau staff proactively cooperated with the internment, and that
census tabulations were directly implicated in the denial of civil rights to citizens of
the United Sates [sic] who happened to also be of Japanese ancestry.’”194  The district
court in Morales recognized the legitimate concerns of citizens regarding the extent
of the information that the government now requires via the census, and hypothe-
sized that the World War II example was not an “isolated incident.”195
d. Arab-Americans in 2004
Given the government’s broad conception of what is proper in the name of
national security, it is not surprising that the Department of Homeland Security turned
to the Census Bureau again in 2004.196  In July of 2004, the New York Times reported
that the Census Bureau “provided specially tabulated population statistics on Arab-
Americans to the Department of Homeland Security, including detailed information
on how many people of Arab backgrounds live in certain ZIP codes.”197  According
to the Deputy Director of the Census Bureau, the information given to Homeland
Security was standard operating procedure.198 He also admitted concern about how
Homeland Security would use the data, but stated that the Census Bureau did not main-
tain the “authority to determine which organization gets which information.”199  The
solution to the issues surrounding the release of information to some government
departments to fulfill federal funding guidelines versus the provision of data that
might be misused (as in the case of the Arab-Americans) is rather simple, argues the
deputy director: “‘The only way we can guarantee that no one will ever be harmed
by our information is to release nothing . . . .  We understand that groups can be
193 Froomkin, supra note 3, at 732–33.
194 MAYER, supra note 167, at 24 (citation omitted).
195 Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 811 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d sub nom.
Morales v. Evans, 275 F.3d 45 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1135 (2002).
196 Froomkin, supra note 3, at 731–33 (discussing how “public servants have shown a
tendency to adopt a ‘vacuum cleaner[ ]’ approach to private information” when national
security is at risk: “[T]he Senate committee charged with investigating domestic surveillance
noted ‘the tendency of intelligence activities to expand beyond their initial scope’ and stated
that government officials ‘have violated or ignored the law over long periods of time and have
advocated and defended their right to break the law.’”).
197 Clemetson, supra note 111, at 14; see also Timothy M. Weber, Values in a National
Information Infrastructure: A Case Study of the U.S. Census PORTTA PROJECT (2004),
http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/papers/weber.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (“[F]rom ‘day
one’ the census has been an institution which has pushed the limits of its Constitutionally
enumerated powers.”).
198 Clemetson, supra note 111, at A14.
199 Id.
2010] SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CENSUS CLAUSE 1125
affected by what we give out, and we understand that can be sensitive. But that is
a societal debate, not a census debate.’”200  Thus, if Congress stops hinging federal
funding on data from the Census Bureau, then there is no legislative need for the
Census Bureau to release data to government entities.  This undercuts the need for
any questions on the census outside of those that directly pertain to apportionment.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO REMEDY THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE ISSUES
WITH THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY
The Census Clause does not constitutionally justify the ACS.  Further, as a matter
of public policy and as a normative concern, the overriding privacy issues as well
as the potential for misuse of the data demonstrate that the government should not
amass this much information on its citizens.  Congress needs to eliminate the ACS.201
Alternatively, if Congress argues that the data is critical for legislating in a modern
world, then Congress needs to justify it under some other clause in the Constitution
or delegate to the individual agencies the power to collect statistical data. Because the
ACS is no longer part of the decennial census, Congress should not administer it like
a census by directing the Census Bureau to conduct annual surveys in order to produce
data for legislative purposes.  Instead, Congress needs to direct each agency that re-
quires data to formulate questions and survey the relevant population group in order
to administer the program at issue.  For example, if the Department of Transportation
(DOT) needs information regarding commuter times to effectively plan for future
development, then Congress should charge the DOT with developing questions and
targeting the specific areas where information is needed.  Not only is this solution
cost-effective, but it also addresses the constitutional concern with justifying the
ACS under the Census Clause, as well as tackles the overwhelming privacy issues
necessarily involved with housing the data from the ACS in one government agency.
A. Cost and Efficiency Arguments for Potential Solutions
In addition to the $11 billion undertaking of conducting a decennial census, the
Census Bureau projects that the ACS costs roughly $150 million on an annual basis,
which amounts to $1.5 billion over a period of ten years.202  Forcing each agency to
200 Id.; see also ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form, supra note 58, at 31 (statement of
Kenneth Prewitt, Director, Bureau of the Census) (“I take note that some Members of Congress
believe that long-form-type questions should not be asked, period. That is an issue for Congress
to resolve. It is not for the Census Bureau to decide what kind of society we should be or
even whether we should have timely and relevant data to make that vision possible.”).
201 The district court in Morales stated that a congressional solution to the privacy concerns
is more appropriate than court intervention. “[A] solution to this problem is one properly
addressed by Congress, not by a court dealing with a purely hypothetical situation.” Morales
v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 811 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
202 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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determine the questions and fund its own survey eliminates the need to allocate those
ACS dollars to the Census Bureau, which is essentially acting as a middleman for col-
lecting information in the current setup for the ACS.  The Census Bureau may then
refocus efforts on the constitutionally mandated task of counting the populace for
apportionment.  Also, presumably if each agency is charged with the task of formu-
lating and paying for the questions, the process itself will become much more efficient. 
Agencies will only ask those questions that are necessary and maintain the flexibility
to change the format or questions to address what is needed in any given year.
B. Constitutional Concerns Regarding Potential Solutions
By implementing an annual ACS and arguing that the Census Clause permits such
an activity, the Census Bureau, which conducts itself in accordance with Title 13 of the
U.S. Code, is acting beyond the scope of what is constitutionally authorized.  In dele-
gating to agencies the responsibility to survey the relevant population group, the con-
stitutional justification for the questions falls within the purpose of these agencies. 
Using the previously mentioned example, if the DOT seeks survey data, then the survey
is likely justified under Congress’s plenary power to regulate commerce, which is the
authority under which Congress created the Department of Transportation.
C. Privacy Issues Alleviated with the Proposal
Allowing each agency to conduct its own survey also addresses privacy concerns
associated with the ACS, which currently permits one government agency to accumu-
late massive amounts of data, in that the data is splintered across multiple agencies. 
Although data spread out across myriad agencies might increase the risk of misuse or
a privacy breach because the data is in the hands of more people, the counterargument
is that each agency would maintain a database of very little information, which means
that less harm is associated with misuse of the data in that limited agency-wide context.
Also, two critical components of the proposed solution are (1) the agencies could
not demand mandatory participation as the ACS now requires,203 and (2) the respon-
dents would submit responses anonymously. Past proposals to reform the census and
the long form included efforts to eliminate the compulsion component of the extrane-
ous questions because those extra questions do not pertain to apportionment. As one
scholar noted: “It has been argued that compulsion should only be used to require
name, date of birth, sex and usual place of residence, and that the remainder of the
census questions should be asked by means of a voluntary, anonymous question-
naire.”204  While the Census Bureau contends that participation rates would drop
203 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 64, at 4 (“Congress’s decision that citizen partici-
pation in the decennial census is so important that there is a mandatory duty to respond also
applies to the American Community Survey.”).
204 CENSUSES, SURVEYS AND PRIVACY 128 (Martin Bulmer ed., 1979).
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without a mandatory compliance law, the government admittedly does not currently
prosecute individuals who choose not to respond.205  Thus, because the government
does not even enforce the mandatory compliance element, eliminating the compulsion
laws associated with the survey would work to quell privacy advocates’ concerns that
the government is forcing disclosure of answers to sometimes invasive questions.206
CONCLUSION
This Note highlights the normative concerns with government data collection via
the ACS and explains how the Census Clause of the Constitution does not authorize
the current ACS.  In an era of technological advances that make it possible for the gov-
ernment to collect more information about the country’s population, it is important to
pause and ask whether the use of a mass survey of society is a prudent idea as a matter
of public policy.  Further, if Congress decides that it needs the data in order to govern
more effectively or efficiently, Congress also needs to consider less invasive, more
secure alternatives that fall within the scope of what is constitutionally authorized.
The Obama administration recently signaled that the Director of the Census
Bureau will report directly to President Obama, rather than to the Secretary of
Commerce, who is the head of the department under which the Census Bureau is
housed.207  Republican leaders criticize the move as politicizing the census,208 and
as a “career professional” in the Census Bureau explained, “‘[t]here’s only one reason
to have that high level of White House involvement . . . . [A]nd it’s called politics.’”209 
Regardless of the purpose of the President’s direct involvement with how the census
is conducted, this Note documents evidence supporting a concern with how the gov-
ernment, and specifically the President, will use the data now and in the future given
the enormous amount of information that is collected, particularly with the use of
the American Community Survey.
205 HILLYGUS, supra note 33, at 5.
206 ACS Hearing to Replace Long Form, supra note 58, at 15 (statement of Rep. Mac
Collins of Georgia) (explaining that most constituent objections focused on “the long form,
which they said took too long to complete and asked questions which were too personal. They
wanted to know why the Census Bureau needed to know about their plumbing or about the
size of their paychecks. Many of them were also worried about the fines for those who either
lie or refuse to answer the questions on the form . . . . [W]e have to ask ourselves if this addi-
tional information is absolutely necessary to fulfill the constitutional purpose of the census,
which is to enumerate the population for the purpose of redistricting.”).
207 See John Fund, Op-Ed., Why Obama Wants Control of the Census, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2009, at A17.
208 See Press Release, Rep. John Boehner, Leader Boehner Questions White House
Takeover of U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://republicanleader.house
.gov/News.
209 Fund, supra note 207.
